Security and Audit
Date: December 11, 2025
Contract: Metanopoly (1B supply, 100M initial, 900M vesting @10M/year)
Scope: Manual code review of the provided contract source. Checked ERC-20 correctness, vesting, ownership/renounce, absence of mint/freeze/blacklist/self-destruct, gas, integration, and UX/attacker scenarios.
Reviewer: Metanopoly Technical Team
1 - Executive Summary (TL;DR)
- Status: No critical vulnerabilities found.
- Contract is simple, gas-efficient, predictable.
- Total supply fixed at 1,000,000,000; minting disabled; no anti-whale/tax/freeze/blacklist; vesting time-locked (10M/year to deployer).
- Owner exists only for manual renounce; renounce does not affect vesting.
- Recommendation: Publish summary and verified source, use multisig for deployer control, monitor large transfers as vesting unlocks.
2 - Audit Scope & Assumptions
- Reviewed final Solidity code with manual renounce and no anti-whale.
- Assumed compiler ^0.8.20, standard EVM behavior.
- No external integrations; standard ERC-20 interaction assumed for DEXes.
3 - Files Reviewed
- Metanopoly contract source (Submitted/Etherscan).
4 - Findings (Categorized)
Critical/High: None
Medium/Low/Info:
- vestingBeneficiary centralized: only deployer can claim 10M/year (recommend multisig/timelock for distribution).
- Owner exists but only for renounce (safe, low risk).
- No minting, freeze, blacklist, or special transfer rules.
- No safeguards against deployer moving large claimed tokens immediately — expected behavior; transparency recommended.
5 - Functional Correctness Checks
- balanceOf / allowance / transfer / approve / transferFrom / increaseAllowance / decreaseAllowance — correct.
- _transfer checks addresses, balances, emits Transfer event.
- claimVestedTokens computes yearsPassed, totalClaimable, claimNow, updates balances, emits events. Reverts if nothing to claim. Prevents over-claiming.
6 - Gas & Integration Notes
- Transfers minimal gas; claimVestedTokens heavier but expected.
- Compatible with Uniswap/DEXes; no transfer restrictions.
7 - Recommendations
- Use multisig (Gnosis Safe) for deployer/vestingBeneficiary (medium business risk mitigation).
- Publish contract source + audit summary on Etherscan/project site (low effort, high trust).
- Set up on-chain alerts for large transfers (Tenderly/Blocknative/EPNS).
- Optional: migration token & decentralized swap to remove central perception (strategic).
- Add public vesting schedule table & FAQ explaining owner renounce doesn't remove vesting rights (low effort, high impact).
8 - Audit Checklist
- Total supply fixed at 1B.
- 100M minted initially; 900M locked, released 10M/year.
- vestingBeneficiary = deployer (immutable).
- Owner only for manual renounceOwnership().
- No minting, freeze, blacklist, or self-destruct.
- Metadata immutable; standard Transfer/Approval events.
9 - Suggested Public Audit Statement
This contract was reviewed for common vulnerabilities and logic correctness. No critical or high-impact issues were identified. Token supply is fixed, minting permanently disabled, vesting deterministic (10M/year to deployer), no freeze/blacklist/self-destruct. Recommended: verify source on Etherscan, use multisig for distribution, publish public vesting schedule.
10 - Example Year-by-Year Vesting
- Year 0: 0 claimable
- Year 1: 10,000,000 claimable
- Year 2: 20,000,000 total claimable
- …
- Year 90: 900,000,000 total claimable (vesting complete)
11 - Final Verdict
Secure & sound for deployment. Minimal, predictable, avoids backdoors. Operational note: deployer controls long-term drip of 900M — intentional vesting, manage via governance/multisig/communication/monitoring.
Produced by Metanopoly Technical Team