Security and Audit

Date: December 11, 2025
Contract: Metanopoly (1B supply, 100M initial, 900M vesting @10M/year)
Scope: Manual code review of the provided contract source. Checked ERC-20 correctness, vesting, ownership/renounce, absence of mint/freeze/blacklist/self-destruct, gas, integration, and UX/attacker scenarios.
Reviewer: Metanopoly Technical Team

1 - Executive Summary (TL;DR)

  • Status: No critical vulnerabilities found.
  • Contract is simple, gas-efficient, predictable.
  • Total supply fixed at 1,000,000,000; minting disabled; no anti-whale/tax/freeze/blacklist; vesting time-locked (10M/year to deployer).
  • Owner exists only for manual renounce; renounce does not affect vesting.
  • Recommendation: Publish summary and verified source, use multisig for deployer control, monitor large transfers as vesting unlocks.

2 - Audit Scope & Assumptions

  • Reviewed final Solidity code with manual renounce and no anti-whale.
  • Assumed compiler ^0.8.20, standard EVM behavior.
  • No external integrations; standard ERC-20 interaction assumed for DEXes.

3 - Files Reviewed

  • Metanopoly contract source (Submitted/Etherscan).

4 - Findings (Categorized)

Critical/High: None

Medium/Low/Info:

  • vestingBeneficiary centralized: only deployer can claim 10M/year (recommend multisig/timelock for distribution).
  • Owner exists but only for renounce (safe, low risk).
  • No minting, freeze, blacklist, or special transfer rules.
  • No safeguards against deployer moving large claimed tokens immediately — expected behavior; transparency recommended.

5 - Functional Correctness Checks

  • balanceOf / allowance / transfer / approve / transferFrom / increaseAllowance / decreaseAllowance — correct.
  • _transfer checks addresses, balances, emits Transfer event.
  • claimVestedTokens computes yearsPassed, totalClaimable, claimNow, updates balances, emits events. Reverts if nothing to claim. Prevents over-claiming.

6 - Gas & Integration Notes

  • Transfers minimal gas; claimVestedTokens heavier but expected.
  • Compatible with Uniswap/DEXes; no transfer restrictions.

7 - Recommendations

  • Use multisig (Gnosis Safe) for deployer/vestingBeneficiary (medium business risk mitigation).
  • Publish contract source + audit summary on Etherscan/project site (low effort, high trust).
  • Set up on-chain alerts for large transfers (Tenderly/Blocknative/EPNS).
  • Optional: migration token & decentralized swap to remove central perception (strategic).
  • Add public vesting schedule table & FAQ explaining owner renounce doesn't remove vesting rights (low effort, high impact).

8 - Audit Checklist

  • Total supply fixed at 1B.
  • 100M minted initially; 900M locked, released 10M/year.
  • vestingBeneficiary = deployer (immutable).
  • Owner only for manual renounceOwnership().
  • No minting, freeze, blacklist, or self-destruct.
  • Metadata immutable; standard Transfer/Approval events.

9 - Suggested Public Audit Statement

This contract was reviewed for common vulnerabilities and logic correctness. No critical or high-impact issues were identified. Token supply is fixed, minting permanently disabled, vesting deterministic (10M/year to deployer), no freeze/blacklist/self-destruct. Recommended: verify source on Etherscan, use multisig for distribution, publish public vesting schedule.

10 - Example Year-by-Year Vesting

  • Year 0: 0 claimable
  • Year 1: 10,000,000 claimable
  • Year 2: 20,000,000 total claimable
  • Year 90: 900,000,000 total claimable (vesting complete)

11 - Final Verdict

Secure & sound for deployment. Minimal, predictable, avoids backdoors. Operational note: deployer controls long-term drip of 900M — intentional vesting, manage via governance/multisig/communication/monitoring.

Verify on Etherscan

Produced by Metanopoly Technical Team